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The counterfeiting of safety critical products such as pharmaceuticals is a significant risk to public 
safety, but the literature suggests that much of the causation of counterfeiting is endogenous: the 
decisions of legitimate producers and consumers facilitate or incentivise the manufacture of 
counterfeits. This study examined what effect the perceived causation of counterfeiting risk (both the 
causes of counterfeiting, and the consequences caused by counterfeiting) had on the risk control 
imperative: the belief that more resources should be allocated to controlling this risk. This involved a 
questionnaire survey of individuals in China, asking them to respond to the risks arising from the 
counterfeiting of specific safety-critical product types. The study found that, although some causes of 
counterfeiting were emphasised much more strongly than others (notably the failure of the authorities, 
profiteering among legitimate producers and the presence of criminal organizations), the less 
emphasised causes were still judged as being relevant. The study found that the association between 
the risk control imperative and both the perceived scale of risk and its causal origins varied across 
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different product types. In one case, the scale of risk was virtually unrelated to control imperative, but 
in all cases at least one of the causal factors, and at least one of the consequential factors, explained 
variation in control imperative. A qualitative comparative analysis also indicated specifically that 
control imperative was lower if an actor who was strongly implicated in the cause of the risks was 
also a bearer of the risks.  
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Product counterfeiting has become a significant risk to public safety. Counterfeits have been found in 
markets ranging from microelectronic devices (recently, for example, Villasenor and Tehranipoor, 
2013) to pharmaceuticals (recently, for example, Gillette, 2013). Counterfeiting essentially involves 
passing off products as though they came from some other more reputable producer, generally 
infringing trademarks (WTO, 2013), and producing economic losses for genuine producers. But 
counterfeit goods are also often poorly made, from substandard materials, which in the case of safety 
critical goods can have fatal consequences: a recently reported example is of cellphone chargers 
allegedly causing electrocution (Merz, 2013). Counterfeit shear bolts and sleeves were implicated in 
an air disaster some time ago (IACC, 2005). And news reports have claimed that fifteen per cent of 
pharmaceuticals imported into the USA are counterfeits (Lister, 2006).  
 
As we argue below, the causes of counterfeiting at least partially arise from the actions of legitimate 
actors. Counterfeiting is not simply a threat from external agents, but a threat that is influenced by the 
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behaviours of both producers and consumers (for example Cordell et al., 1996; Mackenzie, 2010). We 
suggest that this makes it important to investigate the perception of counterfeiting risk, the perception 
of its causes, and the relationship between the two. In particular, it is important to understand how 
strong is the perceived imperative to control this risk at a societal level, and how far this imperative is 
explained by the perceived causation. This appears not to have been studied hitherto, and constitutes 
the research gap we address in this paper. We do this by describing a survey of individuals in China. 
Chinese consumers in particular are claimed to be habituated to consuming counterfeits (Minagawa et 
al 2007). And China is seen as being culturally and institutionally predisposed to producing 
counterfeits (Ming & Xing, 2000; Jiang et al., 2007; Cai et al., 2010). The study attempted to analyse 
how individuals’ perception of the causes and consequences of counterfeiting of safety critical goods 
explained their judgment of how important it was to control the risks of counterfeiting. We looked at 
how judgments of causation compared with the perceived size of the risk in contributing to the risk 
control imperative. And we examined whether the explanation of control imperative remained 
constant across fundamentally different kinds of safety critical product. 
 
In the remainder of the article we first survey the literature on counterfeiting, summarising the causes 
and consequences of counterfeiting risks, and suggesting a model of causation that we can use to 
explore the perception of causation. We then describe the methods used in the survey, give the results, 
discuss the inferences that can be drawn from these, and present a conclusion. The intended 
contribution is to explore the perception of an important risk in contemporary society, and to explore 





In this section we briefly review literature on product counterfeiting generally, and then briefly 
discuss work on the perception of causation within the general risk perception field. For the sake of 





2.1  Factors contributing to counterfeiting activity 
 
There is some literature on theoretical models of product counterfeiting (for example Grossman and 
Shapiro, 1988a; Grossman and Shapiro, 1988b; Feinberg and Rousslang, 1990) but the most relevant 
literature to an analysis of risk perceptions is that making empirical observations. A wide range of 
factors are said to facilitate or encourage counterfeiting. Some of these are essentially cultural, 
geographical, and economic. For example, certain cultures inherently lack strong norms protecting 
trademarks and other intellectual property (Aryanto, 2003, citing Carver, 1996). In such cultures it is 
‘selfish and antisocial for the individual to insist on special compensation for [their] contribution’ 
(Green and Smith, 2002). There is often an associated lack of institutional capacity to regulate and act 
against counterfeiting (Aryanto, 2003), especially in developing countries (Green and Smith, 2002), 
and this is sometimes linked to corruption (Santos and Ribeiro, 2007). In the case of counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals there has been inadequate legislation and enforcement, poor liaison among the 
relevant authorities, a lack of knowledge about counterfeits among health workers and the public, and 
the sale of medicines by untrained vendors, without prescription (Newton et al., 2006). Regulatory 
deficits are by no means confined to developing countries. Vagg and Harris's (2000) UK study points 
to the inadequacy of anti-counterfeiting activity in trading standards authorities, budget restrictions 
that limit counterfeiting prosecutions, and the fragmentation of anti-counterfeiting effort over the 
various enforcement agencies.  
 
Disparities in levels of economic development also encourage copying in less developed regions. 
Aryanto (2003) claims that lags in technology and a lack of spending on research and development 
has led to counterfeiting. Counterfeiting can be seen as a source of employment (Green and Smith, 
2002) and combating it has a low priority where there are significant economic problems (Yar, 2008). 
Trade barriers also have a significant effect. Their removal and the associated increase in cross-border 
flows, together with limited customs inspections (Aryanto, 2003; Yar, 2005), facilitates the trafficking 
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of counterfeits. Yet counterfeiting can also be facilitated by import barriers that sustain local 
monopolies and encourage the copying of foreign brands (Shen et al., 2010). And the presence of 
criminal organizations which exploit the opportunities offered by counterfeiting to fund other criminal 
activity and launder money (Rutter and Bryce, 2008 ) appears to be a significant factor.  Mackenzie 
(2010), for example, refers to ‘the creation and maintenance of highly profitable organized crime 
activity in international markets for fake goods’.  
 
Some of the causes of counterfeiting are claimed to be technological in nature. In particular, the 
technologies of replication like desktop publishing and photographic-quality printing (Yar, 2005) 
makes it increasingly cheap and straightforward to copy packaging and sometimes the good itself 
(Aryanto, 2003). Whereas formerly counterfeiters and forgers had to be highly skilled craftsmen, 
technology spreads the capacity for counterfeiting far more widely (Chaudhry and Walsh, 1996). 
Newton et al. (2006) report that even complex holograms are copied ‘with such detail that it is 
impossible to detect counterfeits with the naked eye’. Unsurprisingly, the technology of the Internet 
has also been implicated. The Internet has been described as a ‘nest for counterfeiting’ (Juillet and 
Vlasto, 2005) for the fairly obvious reasons that it lacks borders and their associated controls. 
Mavlanova and Benbunan-Fich (2010) make the similarly obvious points that counterfeiters can trade 
on the Internet without prior consumer inspection, and use presentational devices to signal their 
apparent trustworthiness. Technologies of various kinds also provide a promising means of deterring 
or impeding counterfeiting, but the experience is that technological solutions are costly, inflating 
product prices and further increasing the price difference between legitimate and counterfeit products. 
And they may provide only temporary protection before counterfeiters find ways of circumventing 
them (Yar, 2008). 
 
Another set of contributory factors involves consumer demand (Veloutsou and Bian, 2008). 
Consumers sometimes seem to have double standards, expecting businesses to have higher standards 
than themselves (Chan et al.., 1998). They are said to develop coping strategies to reduce the 
dissonance that might accompany the knowing consumption of counterfeits (Eisend and Schuchert-
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Güler, 2006). For example, they can devalue the importance of a counterfeit purchase, find ways of 
increasing the value of their choice, or devalue the legitimate product that they rejected. It has also 
been claimed that some consumer populations have attitudes that de-emphasize lawfulness and thus 
attach little stigma to the procurement of counterfeits (Cordell et al., 1996). Some have attitudes that 
are hostile to business corporations, which may only be worsened by the way in which such 
corporations defend their intellectual property (Mandhachitara et al., 2000; Tom, 1998). And some 
simply seem to have got into the habit of consuming counterfeits. Minagawa et al (2007) claim that 
‘Chinese consumers have become so accustomed to cheap, pirated goods that they are unwilling to 
pay full prices for the real thing.’ 
 
A further set of factors implicates legitimate producers. First, branding and advertising lead to goods 
having a fashion value over and above their use value, creating desires that may be satisfied just as 
well with fake goods as original ones (Mackenzie, 2010). Promotion combined with high prices not 
only creates incentives for counterfeiting, but also creates a market among consumers unable to afford 
the legitimate products. Second, legitimate producers can be perceived as profiteering, charging prices 
for branded products that may be seen by both potential counterfeiters and consumers as exorbitant 
(Green and Smith, 2002), and exercising what is perceived as monopolistic control over their 
authorized supply chains (Yar, 2005). Third, market segmentation and selling products at different 
prices in different countries produces ‘gray’ or parallel markets that facilitate infiltration by 
counterfeits. Segmentation creates strong incentives for counterfeiters to sell into higher-priced 
segments (Minagawa et al., 2007), and also means that counterfeits, disguised as parallel imports, 
become harder for the authorities to detect (Vagg and Harris, 2000). Fourth, outsourcing production in 
the pursuit of the lowest manufacturing costs creates opportunities for counterfeiting because designs, 
know-how and infrastructure are transferred to local producers (Mackenzie, 2010; Tom et al., 1998; 
Minagawa et al., 2007). Minagawa et al. (2007) argue that, even in the face of increased 
counterfeiting, firms have continued to outsource to developing countries where counterfeiting is a 
known problem. The licensing of technology is similarly seen as creating a vulnerability to reverse 
engineering and passing-off (Aryanto, 2003). Fifth, producers’ decisions to cease production of goods 
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that are still in demand presents a significant opportunity for counterfeiters. For example, Guide et al. 
(2003) argue that aircraft parts may have a functional life of less than five years, and acquiring a 
replacement may have a lead time in excess of two years, creating an obvious market opportunity for 
counterfeiters. Sixth, Newton et al. (2006) refer to the secrecy practiced by some manufacturers and 
governments about both the general scale of the problem and specific cases of counterfeiting. Some 
firms are said to be unwilling or unable to reply to requests for the authentication of products seized 
by the authorities suspecting they are counterfeits (Vagg and Harris, 2000).  
 
The support offered for all these claims varies, and specific causes are likely to vary between 
contexts. But the literature points to how wide-ranging the causes of product counterfeiting are likely 
to be. It is also noteworthy how much attention the literature gives to the endogenous factors. As Trott 
and Hoecht (2007) claim, it is sometimes a firm’s own strategies and lack of risk management that are 
responsible for the scale of the counterfeiting they face. And, as Qian's (2008) economic modeling 
recognizes, the entry of counterfeits cannot be counted as exogenous when it is influenced by the 
markup and quality levels that the firm sets. Even cultural and geographical influences become 
relevant endogenously when it is the choice of firms to distribute products into regions with cultures 
that encourage counterfeiting, and it is the choice of firms to outsource to, license to, or procure from 
those regions.  
 
2. 2 Effects of counterfeiting activity 
 
In terms of the effects of counterfeiting, there are multiple problems for legitimate firms, mostly 
economic. They are likely to experience losses in immediate sales, losses in goodwill if poor quality is 
attributed to the genuine manufacturer (Dixon and Greenhalgh, 2002), and losses in brand equity if 
consumers realize that part of the available stock of a brand is counterfeit (Green and Smith, 2002, 
citing Wilke 1999). Consumers suffer a corresponding welfare loss if the status of a label declines 
(Grossman and Shapiro, 1988b). It is also quite likely that there will be price falls as expectations of 
quality are diminished (Qian, 2008). Considerable resources are consumed in acting against 
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counterfeiters, for example by legal enforcement of trademark rights (Dixon and Greenhalgh, 2002). 
And there are broader consequences for the economies in which counterfeits are both made and sold: 
falls in tax revenues, job losses, reductions in innovation, the costs of the authorities acting against 
counterfeits in target countries, and the loss of foreign direct investment, foreign exchange earnings 
and tax revenues in the countries where counterfeiting takes place (Dixon and Greenhalgh, 2002). 
 
The consequences are not just economic, however. Two in particular are discussed in the literature. 
The first is the extensive risks to personal safety (Forzley, 2003, Mackenzie, 2010), obviously in 
connection with products like pharmaceuticals and aircraft components (Green and Smith, 2002), but 
commodity electrical goods like battery chargers have also been involved in fatalities that have made 
the national press. Developing an objective account of the hazards of counterfeits has been difficult 
since most safety-related databases do not code for counterfeiting (Forzley, 2003). But counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals in particular pose severe risks to health (Newton et al., 2006). They may contain too 
little or none of the supposed active ingredient, and may contain placebos or even toxins, so causing 
serious illness, producing new side-effects or failing to provide the anticipated cure. The suspicion 
they engender may deter the purchase of the genuine product, they may mislead the medical fraternity 
about the efficacy of the original product, and ultimately may lead to the withdrawal of the genuine 
product (Bosworth, 2006; Newton et al., 2006). Counterfeit safety-critical automotive components are 
gaining a similar notoriety. Yar (2005) catalogues cases where counterfeit brake pads, hoods, oil 
filters and fenders are made from highly sub-standard materials - like compressed grass. In general, 
legitimate producers endeavor to avoid producing sub-standard products since their reputations suffer, 
but counterfeiters do not experience the same constraint. The other main non-economic consequence 
has been the sustaining and enabling of criminal activity. Under the causes of counterfeiting we 
suggested that the presence of criminal organizations facilitates counterfeiting, citing Mackenzie 
(2010) and Rutter and Bryce (2008). But equally the practice of counterfeiting provides a means for 
money laundering and a source of funds for other criminal activity, including terrorism. 





Although the general treatment of counterfeiting emphasizes its damaging effects, there do sometimes 
appear to be favorable effects for certain groups other than counterfeiters. It has been argued that, 
even for the legitimate producer, counterfeiting can help build brand awareness, providing 
'bandwagon' and network effects (Eisend and Schuchert-Güler, 2006; Shultz and Saporito, 1996; 
Staake et al., 2009). Meanwhile, it may give a population access to goods that it could not otherwise 
afford (Green and Smith, 2002). The diffusion of new software, in particular, is said to be facilitated 
by the proliferation of counterfeits (Green and Smith, 2002), locking in users to that software and 
thereby presenting a barrier to entry for legitimate competitors (Staake et al., 2009). Trott and Hoecht 
(2007) argued that imitation is an essential part of the innovation. Such claims about the beneficial 
consequences of counterfeiting are likely to be controversial, but the important point is that there may 
well be a perception that certain legitimate actors sometimes benefit from it.  
 
Figure 1 summarizes the claims made in the literature about the causes and consequences of 
counterfeiting. The wide range of factors indicated here raises a number of questions, such as which 
causes and consequences tend to be most strongly emphasized by risk perceivers, how the factors are 
correlated in their judgments, and how this varies with different products. And, perhaps most 
importantly, there is a question about how judgments of the causes and consequences of 
counterfeiting risks, especially the risks of counterfeited safety-critical goods, influence the 
acceptability of those risks and the imperative to control them.  
 
------------------- Figure 1 about here ------------------- 
 
2.3  Risk perception and causation 
 
How a society perceives the causation of risks arising from phenomena such as counterfeiting matters 
for several reasons. First, we know from Freudenberg (2003) that the perception of an organization’s 
‘recreancy’, or a failure to discharge its responsibilities, is one of the most important factors 
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contributing to risk amplification. If producers are seen as a significant cause of counterfeiting, people 
are likely to exaggerate the risks of counterfeiting and desist from consumption – or exert political 
pressure for greater risk controls by the state. Second, we know from Wolff (2006) that the 
significance of a risk is very often determined by what we think causes it, irrespective of its size. 
Causes which are regarded as immoral in some way – for example because they involve deliberate 
deception – lead the risks to be regarded as socially unacceptable. Third, our theories of what causes 
risk clearly influence what we do to control it (Busby and Duckett, 2012). If we regard the causes of 
counterfeiting as being, in part, to do with anonymous trading channels, we are less likely to use such 
channels to procure goods at risk of being counterfeited.  
 
Most risk perception studies concentrate on the causation of perception rather than the perception of 
causation. The attributes used in the longstanding psychometric model are described as ‘dimensions 
hypothesised to influence perceptions of actual or acceptable risk’ (Fischhoff et al., 1978). Similarly, 
the more recent emphasis on the affective determinants of risk perception (Finucane et al., 2000; 
Slovic et al., 2004; Dohle et al., 2010) is about affect as a cause of perception rather than affective 
reactions to the perception of causes. However, there is some precedent for studying the perception of 
causation. Kuhar et al. (2009), for example, investigated the perception of naturally occurring health 
risks, and one of their primary concerns was causation - both what caused such risks and what health 
consequences they caused in turn. And, typically, some of the attributes in the traditional 
psychometric studies are about causation. For example ‘voluntariness’ (Fischhoff et al., 1978) is 
about whether risk bearers cause a risk through the choices they make. Later work includes attitudes 
like ‘trust in governmental agencies’ (Siegrist et al., 2007) which at least indirectly involve the 
perceptions of other actors as being causal agents in some way.  
 
Typically, risk perception studies are also comparative by intention: asking why (the same) people see 
risks in radically different contexts differently. This creates problems of knowing what is meant by a 
‘risk’ when it is applied over different contexts. And, until subsequent studies (Marris et al., 1997; 
Langford et al., 1999; Bronfman et al., 2003; Siegrist et al., 2005), it was seen as glossing over the 
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considerable variation among individuals perceiving the same risk. But there has also been a tradition 
of studies concerned primarily with specific risk domains, such as nanotechnology (Siegrist et al., 
2007), flooding (Kellens et al., 2011), certain contamination events (Kuhar et al., 2009), terrorism 
(Lee and Lemyre, 2009; Caponecchia, 2012), and disease outbreaks (Prati et al., 2011). A study of 
perceptions around a specific risk - in our case product counterfeiting - again therefore has some 
precedent. It also belongs to an interesting class of risks. Unlike risks of accident and natural disaster, 
it involves intentionally wrongful action by a human agent. Even risks associated with technology, 
such as those of nanotechnology (for example Hornig Priest, 2012), are essentially accidents. 
However, unlike risks of terrorism (for example Lee and Lemyre, 2009), the intention behind 
counterfeiting risk is not primarily an intention to do harm. The counterfeiting of medication with 
clinically inactive substances is an intention to deceive but not to cause physical damage. 
Counterfeiting risks therefore occupy an interesting, and perhaps under-explored, middle ground 
between the commonly explored risks of accidental harm, on the one hand, and deliberate harm on the 
other. 
 
Finally, central to the motivation for exploring risk perceptions has been the question of whether 
people find a risk acceptable. Policy makers want to know which risks are perceived to be 
unacceptable in order to know how to allocate risk-mitigating resources. But there are three main 
problems in analysing risk acceptance: 
1. We accept or reject a technology, not just its risks. Most technologies are ‘packages’ of risks and 
benefits that cannot be easily separated (Slovic et al, 1982). 
2. What makes a risk acceptable is not just the risk itself but the cost of mitigating it (Finkel, 2008). 
We accept some risks largely because they are so costly to reduce. 
3. Counterfeiting is generally illegal and for many people clearly wrongful, and the notion that it can 
be acceptable may seem like a contradiction in terms. 
Our approach is therefore not to ask about the acceptability of counterfeiting risk, but to ask whether 
people think that the counterfeiting risk should be subjected to greater control, and whether more 
resources should be allocated to this control. In other words we ask about ‘risk control imperative’ 
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rather than risk acceptance. This judgment is a relative rather than absolute one, asking whether there 
is an imperative to control the risk, given all the other risks that need controlling and all the other uses 
to which resources could be put. And it allows the perceived costs of mitigation, and any perceived 
benefits, to enter into people’s judgments. The aim of our study has therefore been to analyse how this 
control imperative is associated with the perception of how counterfeiting risks are caused, and what 
consequences they cause in turn.  
 
 
3  METHOD 
 
3.1  Research question 
 
Our research question was how strongly does the perception of causation explain the risk control 
imperative in the case of product counterfeiting? This was addressed in three main stages: 
1. An analysis of how a sample of individuals perceives the causation of the risks. 
2. An analysis of the association between these causation perceptions and the control imperative 
expressed by the individuals. 
3. An analysis of how this association varies between safety-critical counterfeited goods of three 
main types that differ in terms of their intrinsic risks 
We use the model abstracted from the counterfeiting literature, in Figure 1, to organize our study and 
provide specific items for the empirical work.  
 
3.2 Questionnaire instrument 
 
The questionnaire contained a series of items based on the synthesised model shown in Figure 1. Four 
of the causes were excluded from the questionnaire (cost and transience of anti-counterfeiting 




1. individuals are in general unlikely to know about the costliness of anti-counterfeiting technology; 
2. trade barrier removals mostly do not apply to counterfeits both produced and consumed within 
China; 
3. market segmentation is similarly practiced across national borders so is not applicable to 
counterfeits circulating entirely within China;  
4. general attitudes of  lawlessness are unlikely to be experienced or reported in a survey of this 
kind.   
These are conjectures, and it is possible that some of the variance in judgment not explained by the 
remaining items could have been explained by these deleted items. Respondents were asked to rate 
how strongly the set of possible causes explained counterfeiting risks, and how strongly the possible 
consequences were indicated. They were asked to rate the size of the risk they perceived, and to 
express a control imperative by stating how strongly they thought that ‘more resources should be 
spent on managing the risks of this product being counterfeited’.  
 
The questionnaire asked respondents to make these judgments for three different product types 
(alcoholic beverages, pharmaceuticals and automotive parts) that are known to have been 
counterfeited, and where counterfeits are known to have been sub-standard and clearly harmful to 
safety. All three types were safety critical in the sense that sub-standard products could result in 
obvious risks to individual safety or health. But they varied in that 1) one was explicitly intended to be 
health-improving (pharmaceuticals); 2) one had the potential for adverse health consequences even 
when products were not sub-standard (alcohol); 3) one was health-neutral in this sense (automotive 
parts). Having different product types enabled us to make an assessment of how constant individuals’ 
causal attributions were, but also provided a stimulus to the respondents to think more widely and 
deeply about causation. To avoid fatigue just the three product types were incorporated in the design. 
The questionnaire is attached at an appendix, but was translated into Chinese before being 
administered by researchers in one author’s institution. This translation was verified by an 




3.3  Data collection 
 
The questionnaire was administered in Chinese, on paper, to 450 individuals and responses were 
received from 358 (a response rate of 79.6%). Of these, 337 were valid and complete. Respondents 
were recruited through the professional contacts of the author affiliated to the University of Science 
and Technology of China at Hefei. This included two management classes of part-time students, 
employees of 12 local firms, and a distribution of questionnaires to randomly-chosen visitors to the 
university campus. There was no substantial incentive, although all respondents except those in the 12 
firms were given a souvenir valued at 3 CNY. All respondents claimed to be of Chinese nationality 
but this was a convenience sample and cannot be assumed to be somehow representative of the Hefei 
locale, of the province or the country. Demographic details were therefore also collected so that the 
sample could be characterised. Some 143 of the respondents were females and 194 males. Some 65 
stated they were involved in work producing one of the products in question: 14 for alcohol 
beverages, 18 for pharmaceuticals and 33 for automotive parts. There is no a prior reason to expect a 
systematic bias as a result of this involvement: the involvement could produce either a heightened 
hostility to counterfeiters or a degree of sympathy. Figure 2 shows distributions of age, self-perceived 
wealth, employment, education, and locale for the respondent sample. This is intended to convey the 
nature of the sample, and demographic information was not used in the analysis. 
 
------------------- Figure 2 about here ------------------- 
 
3.4  Analysis procedure 
 
Principal component analysis was used to condense the causes into a small number of factors. Risk 
control imperative was then regressed against the condensed causes and the judged size of the risk, to 
find out how strongly causal beliefs predict control imperative in relation to perceived size. This helps 
us not only to find out if the judgment of causation plays a role in control imperative, but also to 
understand how important causation is relative to the size of a risk. If morality, trust (and other 
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aspects of a situation that are related to how a threat comes about) are relevant to the acceptance of a 
risk, causation should be relatively important. If they are not, the size of the risk will presumably be a 
dominant consideration. Standard approaches generally also assess the role of perceived benefit 
(Fischhoff et al, 1978). Because our starting point is the model of Figure 1, all potential consequences 
within the basic causal structure were examined, and this includes different kinds of benefit. But it is 
important to remember that the context - of risks created by product counterfeiting - is different from 
the context of a legitimate product and service which are intended to be beneficial by design. The 
benefits, if there are any, from counterfeiting are relatively minor side-effects or by-products, as 
discussed earlier in the Literature Review (Eisend and Schuchert-Güler, 2006; Shultz and Saporito, 
1996; Staake et al., 2009; Green and Smith, 2002; Trott and Hoecht, 2007). With legitimate products 
and services it is the risks that are typically side-effects or by-products. The analyses are carried out 
separately for the three product types so we can compare their factor structures and regression models. 
 
The final part of the analysis involved a qualitative comparative analysis, assessing the basic idea that 
if causes were endogenous to some actor, and that actor was also a risk bearer, then risks would be 
more acceptable than otherwise. Using a this kind of analysis both 1) allows us to express the 
expected basis for how people make control imperative judgments in logical rather than statistical 
terms, and 2) allows us to examine what turns out to be a strongly asymmetrical relationship between 
control imperative and risk causation. This rationale naturally follows on from the results of the first 
analysis, so an explanation and justification for this procedure are incorporated in the Results section 
that follows.  
 
 
4  RESULTS 
 




The ratings reported for the causes of counterfeiting are shown below in Figure 3, showing the mean 
plus and minus one standard deviation for all items for the three product types. The profile for all 
three product types was very similar. There was a strong tendency to ascribe counterfeiting to failures 
on the part of the authorities and profiteering by legitimate enterprise, as well as the presence of 
criminal organizations. And there was a de-emphasis of consumer attitudes and habit. Other causes 
ranked somewhere between these. But there was substantial variation among respondents, with the 
extreme values of the response interval being used for all items. 
 
------------------------- Figure 3 about here ------------------------- 
 
In terms of the consequences, again the profiles for the three product types are similar as indicated in 
Figure 4. 
 
------------------------- Figure 4 about here ------------------------- 
 
Clearly, the damage to individual and public health, plus the support of criminality, are the 
consequences most strongly perceived. The costs to genuine producers, both in terms of the 
reputational damage and the cash costs of dealing with counterfeits, also figure strongly. Beneficial 
consequences (such as greater consumer access, greater market exposure and lower genuine prices) 
are de-emphasised. Variation around the means tended to be proportionally greater for the lower-rated 
items, however, so there was more disagreement about lower-rated items than about higher-rated 
ones. It is clearly not everyone’s perception that counterfeiting has beneficial consequences, but the 
means for even the lowest-rated items lie above the second point on the 5-point response interval 
(thus above ‘not at all’ in terms of effect). The notion that poorer consumers benefit is given more 
credence in the case of automotive parts than the other two product types, and that consumers suffer 





4.2  The structure of causal judgments 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show the factors obtained from the principal components analyses separately for the 
different product types after varimax rotation. Factor labels are given at the base of the table, intended 
to capture the higher factor loadings shown in bold font. The first table (Table 1) concerns causation. 
 
--------------------- Table 1 about here --------------------- 
 
The factor structures for the different products are not radically different, but they are not identical. 
For alcohol, the first factor clearly implicates the role of the primary risk bearers (the consumers) in 
counterfeiting risks, also incorporating an item related to producers (‘Genuine producers failing to 
meet to demand’) that implicates consumers as well as producers. The second factor is perhaps less 
coherent, combining societal and technological causes with the damaging practices of producers. It 
suggests that technology facilitating counterfeiting (which could include both production and copying 
technology) is not specifically seen as an exogenous element. The third factor more clearly concerns 
the social environment. And the fourth combines the failure of the authorities with what might be 
regarded as the mistakes of producers. For pharmaceuticals, again the factor accounting for most 
variance clearly implicates consumers, the second factor implicates producers, and the third points to 
the social environment. The fourth factor this time is less coherent, combining technology and 
producers’ promotional practices. For automotive parts, the first factor again concerns consumer 
attitude and practice, the second the social and technological environment, and the third implicates 
producers. For all three cases, failure by the authorities loads negatively and fairly substantially on the 
factor expressing consumer disposition, suggesting there is a pronounced opposition drawn between 
the authorities and consumers. 
 




--------------------------- Table 2 about here ----------------------- 
 
For alcohol, the factor structure clearly differentiates consumer and public loss from producer loss, 
and both kinds of loss from benefit to both consumers and producers. The only ambiguous feature is 
that producer price reduction is combined with benefits, suggesting that respondents identify the 
consumer benefits of price reduction more strongly than the producer losses. For pharmaceuticals, the 
structure is very similar, with consumer harm from product quality loss loading more heavily on 
consumer and public loss as might be expected. For automotive parts the structure was again similar, 
although now producer price reduction loads more heavily on producer loss than benefit.  
 
4.3  The association with control imperative 
 
The results of regressing the judgments of risk control imperative against the causal and consequential 
factors, and the size of the risk, are summarised in the following tables. Generally, the models show 
weak effects with very low adjusted R2 values, but p-values that are statistically significant. Table 3 
shows the regression models for causation.  
 
--------------------------- Table 3 about here ----------------------- 
The size of risk has a strongly statistically significant influence for pharmaceuticals and automotive 
parts, and more weakly for alcohol. But the picture for factors expressing judgments of causation is 
more ambiguous. For pharmaceuticals, all factors except producer-related causes have significant 
influences. For automotive parts, only causes related to society and technology are significant, and for 
alcohol only consumer-related causes have significance. This is commented on in the Discussion. As 
the data come from choices from a finite set of possible responses, and as the control imperative 
dependent variable is a single item, an ordinal logistic model is, in principle, more appropriate than a 
simple linear model. But applying such a model to the same data, both to the factor scores and 




Table 4 shows the models for control imperative against consequences and size of risk. As there was a 
similar set of principal components for each product type (with some differences in the items loading 
on them) these can be tabulated together, although it needs to be remembered that the independent 
variables listed on the left are defined slightly differently for each product type, as shown earlier in 
Table 2. 
 
--------------------------- Table 4 about here ----------------------- 
  
Again, although the models have statistical significance, values of adjusted R2 are very low. In the 
case of alcohol the size of the risk has no obvious effect on control imperative, whereas all the 
consequential factors do; yet in the case of pharmaceuticals and automotive parts, the consumer and 
public loss is the only consequential factor with a statistically significant effect, and the size of the 
risk is significant.   
 
4.4  A qualitative comparative analysis  
 
A qualitative comparative analysis was then carried out broadly using the method suggested by Ragin 
(2009) to look at the relationship between control imperative judgments and the location of 
responsibility. One problem with the data is that the distribution of risk control imperative judgments 
is strongly skewed towards high ratings. This was not inevitable, given comments in the literature 
about the apparent normality of counterfeiting in China, but may reflect the fact that such comments 
are now several years old. So low control imperative turned out to be relatively unusual, and what is 
therefore of primary interest is what conditions are associated with this low control imperative. It was 
suggested earlier that a key aspect of causation in the counterfeiting context was endogeneity: the way 
in which the decisions of legitimate actors (not just the counterfeiters) contributed to counterfeiting 
risk. This suggests that we should test the idea that if actor A is the one mainly at risk, finding low 
control imperative means that A is the one mainly responsible for the cause of the risk. The regression 
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models do not examine this notion, which we call ‘risk bearer causation’, since they were set up to 
compare separately the role of causes and consequences with the size of the risk in explaining control 
imperative ratings. Regression also essentially looks for a symmetric relationship where, for example, 
low control imperative is associated with high risk bearer causation, and high control imperative is 
associated with low risk bearer causation. We are suggesting that where there is low control 
imperative then there should be high risk bearer causation (the reason for low control imperative). But 
where there is high control imperative there may or may not be low risk bearer causation, since other 
reasons (probably moral) producing control imperative may dominate.  
 
Following Ragin (2009) and similar studies, reviewed for example by Rihoux (2006), we can use a 
‘configurational’ approach to follow more closely the reasoning of what inhibits control imperative. 
The basic intuition expressed in the previous paragraph, that lack of control imperative logically 
implies risk bearer causation, can be stated in basic propositional form as: 
 ~ Control imperative ⊃ Risk bearer causation 
There are broadly two possibilities for the right-hand term, giving:  
~ Control imperative ⊃  (Consumer losses ⊃ Consumer causes)    
or: 
~ Control imperative ⊃  (Consumer causes ⊃ Consumer losses)     
The first says that whenever the consumer is at risk of some loss, they should also be a cause of the 
risk in order for there to be ‘risk bearer causation’. On the other hand, the second says that whenever 
the consumer is judged to be a cause, they should be at risk of loss. The same possibilities apply to 
producers, their losses and their roles as causal agents, so we can use the data to explore the following 
models: 
~ Control imperative ⊃  ((Consumer losses ⊃ Consumer causes) V  
            (Producer losses ⊃ Producer causes))    
And: 
~ Control imperative ⊃  ((Consumer causes ⊃ Consumer losses) V 




We investigate this by following Ragin’s (2009) procedure of interpreting judgment levels (the 
respondent ratings) as membership values of fuzzy sets, and applying fuzzy set interpretations of 
Boolean operators. Because the factor structure of causes did not follow actors exactly, the original 
items are used to formulate a value for: 
Consumer causes ≡ Consumer willingness to consume counterfeits V  
          Consumer hostility towards large businesses V  
      Consumer buying counterfeits out of habit      
Similarly: 
Consumer losses ≡ Consumers suffer poor health or injury V 
     Consumers suffer loss of product quality V  
      Public health deteriorates V  
      Society suffers from funding of criminality  
For producers: 
Producer causes ≡ Heavy product promotion V  
    Making large profits V  
    Authorizing others to make their products V  
    Providing insufficient products to meet demand V  
    Hiding the fact of counterfeiting 
And: 
Producer losses ≡ Reputation loss V  
    Price reduction V  
    Sales fall V  
    Costs of counteracting counterfeits 
Ratings on a response interval of 1 to 5 are converted linearly into a fuzzy membership function from 
0 to 1.0. Conjunctions are found in fuzzy logic by taking a minimum and disjunctions by taking a 
maximum. The linear membership function is an assumption, and seems reasonable given the 
intuitiveness of linearity for subjects making their responses. But – as we have no evidence to support 
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this – the results must be seen as being provisional. Kochen (1975) indicates that variation in 
reasoning style among individuals does affect the relevant membership function. And Ragin (2000, p. 
167) cautions against simply assuming low and high ratings can be translated into low and high 
membership values. But he also (Ragin, 2000, p. 169) suggests taking respondent-given ratings as 
membership scores. And Yen and Langari (1999, p. 27), while listing a wide range of possible 
membership functions, recommend triangular or trapezoidal functions (corresponding to our linear 
relation between rating and membership) ‘unless there is a good reason to do otherwise’. In the results 
below we assess their sensitivity to different assumptions about the relevant membership function.  
 
Ragin’s (2006) consistency index tests for the condition that some configuration implies some 
outcome. It is defined as 
Consistency(Xi, Yi) = Σi (minimum(Xi, Yi))/Σi (Xi) 
where Xi and Yi are specific configurations and outcomes. In our case we want to test whether 
inhibited control imperative implies risk bearer causation. So our Xi are the control imperative 
judgments and our Yi are the strengths with which risk bearer causation holds. The index is high when 
the Xi are consistently lower than the corresponding Yi or equal to them. This is indicated because the 
conditions which contradict the implication X ⊃ Y are those in which there is a strong belief in X but 
only a weak one in Y. Ragin (2006) also defines coverage as 
Coverage(Xi, Yi) = Σi (minimum(Xi, Yi))/Σi (Yi) 
This is high only when risk bearer causation also implies inhibited control imperative, in other words 
when there are no other, more dominant factors that shape control imperative. There are two logical 
forms to test, (1) and (2) indicated above, for each of the three product types. Table 5 shows the 
results. 
 




The high consistency values show that the data is strongly consistent with our proposed models. But 
the low coverage values show that much of what explains the risk control imperative lies beyond the 
condition of risk bearer causation. 
 
Finally, to give some idea of the sensitivity of these results to our assumption about a linear 
membership function, we re-calculated the consistency and coverage values for the third product 
assuming a relatively steep logistic membership function, f(x) = 1/(1 + e-3(x – 3)), which maps ratings [1, 
2, 3, 4, 5] to approximately [0.00, 0.05, 0.50. 0.95, 1.0] instead of [0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0]. This 
changes the consistency and coverage values shown in Table 5 from (0.992, 0.959) and (0.200, 0.220) 
to (0.988, 0.932) and (0.13, 0.13). The numerical results are thus different, but the qualitative 
conclusions are unchanged. 
 
 
5  DISCUSSION 
 
5.1  Causal judgments 
 
Certain causes and certain consequences were given much greater credence than others. In particular, 
agency for counterfeiting risks was most strongly attributed to criminal organizations, profiteering 
producers and inept state authorities. Substantially less credence was given to cultural explanations, 
and very little to the behaviour and attitudes of consumers. Thus the picture is one in which 
individuals see causation as mostly arising from specific, organizational actors. But it is important to 
say that all causes and consequences received average responses greater than ‘none at all’. 
Respondents, in aggregate, recognized that consumers played a finite, if small, role in the risks arising 
from counterfeits, and that there was a finite, if small, benefit to parts of legitimate society. 
 
The factor structures tended to separate out causation according to the main agents - distinguishing 
causes attributable to consumers from those attributable to producers and those attributable to the 
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social environment. But there was an indication that what might be considered mistakes on the part of 
producers are sometimes distinguished from damaging attitudes or practices. And the place of 
technology varied somewhat between product types, in one case combining with cultural and societal 
items but in the other cases also combining with producer-related items. This suggested that, in some 
cases, technology is seen as a given - part of the general background of society in which 
counterfeiting risks arise - but sometimes is seen as the responsibility of producers and can be part of 
the role they play in facilitating counterfeiting. 
 
For the consequences, the factor structure separated out losses from benefits, although it separated 
consumer and public losses from producer losses, without separating consumer and producer benefits. 
The structures were similar for the three products, but producer price reductions sometimes associated 
mainly with benefits and sometimes (in the case of automotive parts) with losses. It is potentially an 
important message that certain kinds of risk, at least certain kinds of economic risk, can be seen as 
both harmful and beneficial, depending on the context. It is a reminder that risks are ultimately 
relational (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011) - only risky when relating to someone in a way that harms 
their interests (Garland, 2003).  
 
5.2  Control imperative judgments 
 
All regression models showed statistical significance but low or very low R2 values. It is almost 
certain that the relationship between control imperative and the combination of causal judgments and 
risk size, although it is weak, is not a result of chance. But variation in control imperative does not 
arise primarily from judgments of how risks are caused or even how large in magnitude they are. 
Moreover, the roles of causation and size varied. As we discuss below, specific causal factors 
sometimes had significance when size did not, yet sometimes size had strong significance when 
specific causal factors did not. There is no single answer to the question whether the way a risk is 
caused is more or less important than the size of that risk in determining its control imperative. And it 
is reasonable to conclude that, although causation and size do have an influence in specific ways, 
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people give counterfeiting risk a high control imperative largely because they find the act of 
counterfeiting inherently objectionable. Causation and size come second, supporting Wolff’s (2006) 
argument that blameworthy risks can attract more concern than large-scale risks, and supporting 
Sjöberg’s (2000) emphasis on the importance of morality in risk perception. 
 
This is also supported by the way the potential benefits of counterfeiting to the legitimate economy, 
which would probably be regarded as controversial in any case, played no role in variations in control 
imperative. Although the principal components analysis revealed a factor we labelled ‘consumer and 
producer benefit’ for all three product types, this factor had no statistical significance in any of the 
regressions. Thus counterfeiting was not regarded as a risk that is traded off against some 
countervailing benefit. 
 
The purpose of the qualitative comparative analysis was to find out what inhibited control imperative 
in the relatively small number of cases in which it was judged to be low. Simple propositional logic 
provided a natural way of expressing the idea that if we find control imperative to be low then we can 
infer that there is risk bearer causation: that the actors causing the risk are also the risk bearers - either 
because we think risk bearers should be the risk causers, or because we think risk causers should also 
be risk bearers. The results of the analysis bore this out. Control imperative was only inhibited when 
risk bearer causation was high (although it was high when risk bearer causation was both high and 
low). 
 
5.3  The nature of the goods  
 
The analysis suggested that the type of products makes a difference to the role that the causal factors 
and size of risk play. All three goods are safety critical in the sense that if they are manufactured in 
the wrong way they can kill those who consume them. This risk has probably materialised in all three 
cases, and in all three cases it is readily imaginable without expert knowledge. But alcohol is not, 
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generally speaking, regarded as a healthcare product and consumption of alcohol is associated with 
risk to health, even when genuine. Automotive components are not products specifically intended to 
enhance health, but they are not inherently harmful if manufactured correctly. Pharmaceuticals are 
intended to enhance health so, when harmful, their effects are particularly at odds with expectations.  
 
The fact that, for alcohol, the size of risk was only weakly predictive of the control imperative (in the 
causal model) and not predictive at all (in the consequential model) is understandable, given that 
consuming genuine alcohol is itself risky. For pharmaceuticals and automotive components the size of 
risk is more predictive of control imperative in both models because the consumption of genuine 
goods should not carry appreciable risk. It is interesting that Sjöberg (1999) found in two empirical 
studies that perceptions of the size of risk tended to be associated with probability, whereas the 
demand for risk reduction was associated with consequence. This apparent dissociation of risk size 
and control imperative is significant. Our results suggest that it is context sensitive: that, at least in the 
case of risks arising from counterfeiting, size is sometimes predictive of control imperative and 
sometimes not. They also suggest that the role of causation is context sensitive, generally important in 
some contexts but not in others. Context also selects particular causal factors for significance. The one 
constant across all three products was the consistency of the results with the proposition that 
diminished control imperative implies risk bearer causation. 
 
 
6  CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of the study was to understand certain aspects of how the risks presented by product 
counterfeiting are perceived. It is a risk that is very characteristic of modernity: a risk that arises 
because, in modern production systems, consumers must rely on trademarks and other kinds of 
signalling devices due to the fundamental knowledge asymmetry between themselves and producers 
(Ramello, 2006). They cannot know enough technical information about a pharmaceutical, for 
example, and about pharmacology in general, to assess its safety in any fundamental way. They have 
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to rely on its trademark. When the trademark is fraudulently copied, a considerable risk is created. 
Counterfeiting is therefore a fundamental threat in a modern society, and counterfeiting risk an 
important risk to understand in its own right.  
 
Our account of how people perceive this risk has been specifically concerned with the role of 
perceived causation. This was motivated by the heavy emphasis in the literature on the endogeneity of 
the causes of counterfeiting, and the ambiguous status of some of the consequences. The practices of a  
legitimate producer, including market segmentation, differential pricing, heavy advertising, restrictive 
distribution and so on probably encourage the production of counterfeits, for example. We were 
interested in how much influence individuals’ perceptions of causation had, relative to their 
perception of how big the risks were, when they made judgments about control imperative. Perhaps 
surprisingly we found that judged causation played only a small role. And with some kinds of product 
even the size of the risk played little obvious role. The situation varied across different product types, 
and for all product types the data was strongly consistent with the idea that what can make risks 
acceptable is that the agent of a risk is also a risk bearer.  
 
For risk managers, it would be hard to justify not paying attention to risks associated with a 
phenomenon like the counterfeiting of safety critical products. Yet the attention paid to such risks still 
has to be rationed. The message from this study appears to be that it cannot be rationed on the basis of 
some risk-benefit balance because individuals see little (although non-zero) benefit to legitimate 
actors from counterfeiting. But, equally, it cannot be rationed on the basis that those who bear the 
risks are also, to some degree, agents of their own misfortune. Even when this is true, it has only a 
minor effect on the acceptability of those risks.  
 
Our intended contributions are these: 
• To have explored risk perceptions in relation to the important risk issue of product counterfeiting, 
an issue that, in terms of intentionality, occupies a middle ground between accidents (in which 
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there is characteristically no wrongful intention) and terrorism (in which the intention is to cause 
harm).  
• To have explored risk perceptions in Chinese society: a society in which the counterfeiting risk is 
often thought of as being endemic, in which consumers and producers are sometimes regarded as 
being ambivalent about the counterfeiting phenomenon, and one that now constitutes the world’s 
second largest economy. 
• To have explored the perception of causation, specifically, analysing how far this influences the 
risk control imperative. 
 
The most obvious limitation of the work is the use of a convenience sample, suggesting the need to 
replicate the study with a nationally representative sample of respondents. But the study also relied on 
the literature on counterfeiting to generate the items to which individuals responded, and there is a 
need for a more open-ended investigation of how people attribute causation for risks such as 
counterfeiting whose risks are complex and involve agents acting with intention but not the intention 
to cause physical harm. There is also a need to explain the variance that causation and size of risk 
failed to explain in this study - perhaps to follow Sjöberg (2000) and take account of individuals’ risk 
sensitivity and their attitude (in this case, especially their attitude to criminality). There is also a 
question about the significance of individuals’ risk perceptions, and especially the average of those 
perceptions, in a society that is experiencing rapid and uneven economic growth. Is the relatively 
weak relationship between the causes of counterfeiting risk and control imperative something that 
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The following schedule of items was presented separately for each product type (alcoholic beverages, 
pharmaceuticals and automotive components) indicated as [x]. The administered questionnaire was 




Does your work involve producing [x]? 
 
Yes No 
   []           []      
How serious are the health and safety risks of consuming [x]? 
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     []  
Please say how 
much you think 






A culture that says it is okay to copy other products 
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
The growth of trading on the Internet 
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
The presence of criminal organizations 
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Big differences in wealth between different groups 
in society 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Technology that makes it easier to copy products 
and make counterfeits 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Genuine producers heavily promoting and 
advertising their products 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Genuine producers charging high prices 
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Genuine producers authorizing other firms to make 
their products as subcontractors 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Genuine producers do not provide sufficient 
products to the market to meet consumers demand 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Genuine producers hiding the occurrence of 
counterfeiting to maintain confidence in their brand 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Authorities failing to take action against 
counterfeiters 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Consumers being willing to consume known 
counterfeits 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Consumers being hostile towards big business 
corporations 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Consumers buying fake products out of habit 
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 







Genuine producers lose their good reputation 
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Genuine producers have to reduce prices 
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Genuine producers lose sales 
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Genuine producers have to meet the costs of 
dealing with counterfeiters 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Genuine producers actually benefit from the extra 
exposure that counterfeits create 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
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Genuine producers are stimulated by counterfeiting 
to produce better products 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Consumers suffer from poor health or injury 
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Consumers suffer from loss of product quality 
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Poorer consumers actually benefit from greater 
access to products 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Public health and safety gets worse 
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
Society suffers from the funding of criminals 
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
 How strongly do you feel that more resources should be spent on 
managing the risks of this product being counterfeited? 
 
Do you think more resources should be spent on managing the risks 
of this product being counterfeited?  
 
Not at all A lot 
    []     []     []     []     [] 
 
No                   Certainly 








































Causes exogenous to producers and consumers: 
Culture tolerating intellectual property rights violation 
Authorities failing to act 
Large disparities in wealth between groups 
(Removal of trade barriers and restrictions) 
Presence of criminal organizations 
High-fidelity reproduction technology facilitating copying 
Growth of Internet trading 
(Cost and transience of anti-counterfeiting technology) 
 
causes 
Causes endogenous to consumers: 
Willingness to consume known 
counterfeits 
(Attitudes of lawlessness) 
Hostility towards ‘big business’ 
Habituation to consuming counterfeits 
 
Causes endogenous to producers: 
Heavy promotion of products 
Profiteering 
(Market segmentation and differential pricing) 
Outsourcing and licensing production 
Failing to meet demand eg by stopping production 
Hiding the incidence of counterfeiting 
Counterfeiting activity 




Cost of prevention and mitigation 
Additional market exposure  
Stimulus to produce at higher quality 
 
 
Consequences for consumers and public(s): 
Individual safety and health harms 
Product quality loss 
Public health and safety detriments 
Funding of criminality and terrorism 








      Age of respondent/years       Self-declared wealth 
 
  






Figure 3: Mean responses plus or minus one standard deviation for all causes for the three product types  
 





Figure 4: Mean responses plus or minus one standard deviation for all consequences for the three product types  
 
      Alcoholic beverages    Pharmaceuticals    Automotive parts 
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Table 1: Factor structures for causes 
 
 Alcohol Pharmaceuticals Automotive parts 
Item F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 
A culture tolerating product copying .111 .069 .648 .109 .167 .087 .763 .041 .136 .765 .042 
The growth of trading on the Internet .146 .174 .719 .056 .249 .139 .699 .160 .254 .693 .197 
The presence of criminal organizations -.173 .115 .717 .129 -.210 .140 .658 .240 -.176 .648 .172 
Large differences in wealth between groups .066 .646 .332 -.154 .159 .434 .148 .407 .250 .428 .439 
Technology facilitating counterfeit production -.064 .512 .328 .193 -.074 -.072 .306 .797 -.056 .697 .187 
Heavy promotion of the genuine products .220 .696 .042 .026 .286 .290 -.015 .692 .344 .452 .445 
Profiteering by genuine producers -.048 .713 .041 .153 -.121 .616 .013 .332 .053 .161 .698 
Genuine producers outsourcing production .064 .405 .116 .591 .109 .732 .205 -.053 .023 .136 .776 
Genuine producers failing to meet demand .552 .410 -.113 .193 .426 .609 -.022 .121 .461 .060 .550 
Genuine producers not admitting counterfeiting .283 .094 .073 .739 .249 .687 .219 .002 .148 .200 .639 
Authorities failing to act against counterfeits -.135 -.064 .146 .674 -.391 .114 .405 -.067 -.457 .281 .179 
Consumers being willing to consume counterfeits .811 .042 .080 .018 .843 .189 .038 .088 .729 .143 .267 
Consumers being hostile towards big business .856 .037 .106 -.011 .857 .188 .089 .011 .799 .114 .139 
Consumers buying counterfeits out of habit .821 -.014 -.021 .035 .847 .139 .074 .068 .840 .082 .188 
Consumer behavior and demand Consumer behavior Consumer behavior   
Producer behavior , society & technology Producer behavior Culture, society & technology  
Culture, trends and criminality Culture, trends and criminality Producer behavior 
Producer and authority negligence Technology and promotion    
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Table 2: Factor structures for consequences 
 
 Alcohol Pharmaceuticals Automotive parts 
Item F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 
Genuine producers losing a good reputation .264 .009 .639 .225 .060 .619 .198 .732 -.124 
Genuine producers having to reduce prices -.135 .702 .315 -.134 .658 .281 -.255 .562 .469 
Genuine producers losing sales -.037 .188 .787 -.023 .164 .748 .031 .787 .094 
Genuine producers incurring prevention costs .160 .034 .755 .156 -.069 .757 .324 .544 .044 
Genuine producers  benefitting from  extra exposure -.101 .738 -.206 -.037 .779 -.051 -.098 -.067 .808 
Genuine producers stimulated to make improvements -.059 .630 .205 -.081 .572 .329 .138 .404 .491 
Consumers suffering from poor health or injury .708 -.203 .174 .789 -.123 .013 .828 .142 -.095 
Consumers suffering from loss of product quality .482 .254 .241 .676 -.035 .091 .812 .002 .042 
Poorer consumers benefitting from greater product access .135 .642 .029 -.055 .741 -.152 -.030 .026 .725 
Public health and safety deteriorating .862 -.033 .034 .811 -.115 .155 .870 .136 -.092 
Society suffering from the funding of criminals .792 -.039 .044 .818 -.032 .108 .794 .157 -.027 
Consumer & public loss Consumer & public loss Consumer & public loss   
Consumer & producer benefit Consumer & producer benefit Producer loss  






Table 3: Risk control imperative explained by causal factors and scale of risk  
 
 Alcohol Pharmaceuticals Automotive parts 
Adjusted R2 .043  .143  .165  
ANOVA model significance .002  .000  .000  













(Intercept) 3.245 .000** 2.767 .000** 2.413 .000** 
Scale of risk .185 .011* .351 .000** .409 .000** 
Consumer behavior and 
demand 
-.122 .021*     
Producer behavior, society 
and technology 
.039 .460     
Culture, trends and 
criminality 
.071 .182     
Producer and authority 
negligence .093 .080     
Consumer behavior   -.199 .000**   
Producer behavior   -.058 .219   
Culture, trends and 
criminality   .139 .004**   
Technology and producer 
promotion 
  .125 .009**   
Consumer behavior     -.082 .080 
Culture, society and 
technology 
    .206 .000** 
Producer behavior     -.021 .642 
 
* p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01
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Table 4: Control imperative explained by consequential factors and scale of risk  
 
 Alcohol Pharmaceuticals Automotive parts 
Adjusted R2 .119  .158  .175  
ANOVA model significance .000  .000  .000  













(Intercept) 3.635 .000** 2.736 .000** 2.815 .000** 
Scale of risk .098 .183 .358 .000** .320 .000** 
Consumer and public loss .171 .001** .270 .000** .252 .000** 
Consumer and producer 
benefit -.124 .015* -.084 .078 .047 .303 
Producer loss .250 .000** .092 .052 -.016 .734 
 
* p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01
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Table 5: Consistency and coverage indices for the configurational analysis 
 
Product Consistency  Coverage  
 Form (1) Form (2) Form (1) Form (2) 
Alcohol 0.997 0.958 0.243 0.285 
Pharmaceuticals 0.995 0.973 0.140 0.180 
Automotive parts 0.992 0.959 0.200 0.220 
 
